Sharing responsibility in disaster management policy by Atkinson, C & Curnin, S
Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100122
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Progress in Disaster Science
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /pd isasRegular ArticleSharing responsibility in disaster management policyCameron Atkinson ⁎, Steven Curnin
University of Tasmania, Private Bag 22, Hobart TAS 7001, Australia⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Cameron.atkinson@utas.edu.au. (C. Atki
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100122
2590-0617/© 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This isA B S T R A C TA R T I C L E I N F OArticle history:
Received 10 June 2020
Received in revised form 2 August 2020
Accepted 5 August 2020
Available online 11 August 2020The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction delivers internationally agreed upon norms for disaster risk reduc-
tion, engendered in part through shared-responsibility, and subsequently adopted by Australia. However, it has been
contended that shared-responsibility in Australia is a partially articulated social contract. Through targeted engage-
ment with the works of Foucault, a combination of document analysis on selected disaster risk reduction policies
and employing a taxonomy of obligations of shared-responsibility, we investigate if shared-responsibility signifies
the failure of dominant disaster management discourses to articulate concrete responsibilities. We identify that an in-






The Sendai Framework For Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) exhorts
shared-responsibility as a guiding principle in delivering its four priorities
for action: (1) understanding disaster risk; (2) strengthening disaster risk
governance to manage disaster risk; (3) investing in disaster risk reduction
for resilience; and (4) enhancing disaster preparedness for effective re-
sponse, and to ‘Build Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and recon-
struction [1]. Shared-responsibility in Australia was identified as early as
2011 as an important element in enhancing disaster resilient communities
in Australia [2]. Justification for focusing on terminology such as resilience
rests on the terms ubiquity across several disciplines, including resource
management [3], socio-ecological-systems [4,5] and engineering [6]. Justi-
fication for shared-responsibility is its prominence in disaster management
literature.
Since the release of the Australian National Strategy for Disaster Resil-
ience (NSDR) in 2011, there has been an attempt at coordinating how
Australia prepares for, and responds to, disasters. As each state in
Australia is constitutionally responsible for preparing for and responding
to disasters, this is no simple task. The release of the National Framework
for Disaster Resilience (NFDRR) in 2018 is a fulfilment of Australia's com-
mitment in implementing the SFDRR. This policy serves as themost current
document which identifies the reduction of disaster risks and the necessity
of building community resilience in mitigating the risks posed by disasters
in contemporaryAustralia. Central to these documents is themantra that by
‘sharing responsibility’, there is a greater chance of enhancing the resiliencenson).
an open access article under the Cof Australian communities. Each state and territory in Australia is then re-
quired to implement their own frameworks and strategies for building resil-
ience and reducing disaster risks.
Shared-responsibility implies that each segment of society has obliga-
tions in disaster management. For this to be possible, governments and
their agencies need to clearly articulate what is expected when prescribing
them and their implications. Lukasiewicz, Dovers and Eburn (2017) con-
tend that as natural disasters stretch the limits of emergency services and
national governments, shared-responsibility becomes the vehicle by
which all actors contribute to disaster resilience. These authors employed
a literature review and document analysis of the NSDR and associated pol-
icy documents to ‘clarify, organise and operationalise the necessarily gen-
eral policy goal of shared responsibility’ in an Australian context. Their
analysis brings to the fore the central role governments play in disaster
management in Australia. Importantly, their work uncovers the lack of em-
phasis placed on highlighting community empowerment in a shared re-
sponsibility paradigm. Understandably, this is not the first instance where
issues surrounding the application of shared-responsibility have been
bought to light in an Australian context. In McLennan and Handmer's
(2014) report, ‘Sharing Responsibility in Australian Disaster Management
- Final Report for the Sharing Responsibility Project’, the authors contend
that shared-responsibility in Australia is a partially articulated social con-
tract. The reason for this claim is that shared-responsibility is a metaphor
for a renegotiation of roles and responsibilities in disaster management in
Australia. However, McLennan and Handmer argue that the benefits and
rights which citizens would receive under this new paradigm, are missing.C BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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roles, of shared-responsibility. We contend that this partial articulation
could be the result of an incomplete process of normalisation in
Australian disaster management policy. This claim is given further weight
when combinedwith Lukasiewicz et al.'s (2017) recognition of a lack of em-
phasis placed on community empowermentwithinAustralian disasterman-
agement arrangements.
The French historian and philosopher, Michel Foucault, posited that
normalisation can be viewed as a method which simultaneously homoge-
nises and individualises subjects through ordering, observation, exclusion,
control, and intervention [7,8]. Applying this explanation to Australian di-
saster management discourses, normalisation can be observed as the ho-
mogenisation and articulation of rules, norms, objectives, and goals in
disaster management. Consequently, shared-responsibility becomes essen-
tial as it links the security and well-being of both individual and collective
life [9]. This is achieved principally, through the assignment of different
roles and responsibilities, for different segments of Australian society. The
normalisation of rules, norms, objective, and goals is an important element
in the creation of a biopolitical regime [7]. For shared-responsibility to con-
tribute to enhancing the security and well-being of individual, and collec-
tive life in Australia, clear rules, definitions, goals, and objectives are
required. The absence of a complete normalisation process results not
only in a partially articulated social contract (McLennan and Handmer
2014), but also a disempowered community [11] that is not properly pre-
pared when a disaster occurs.
This paperwill assert that shared-responsibility in Australia is a partially
articulated social contract as a result of an incomplete process of normalisa-
tion. Furthermore, the paperwill explore if this process devolves from inter-
national to national polices in the context of the Australian disaster
resilience policy landscape. In doing so, this paper will use the SFDRR,
the NFDRR and the recently released Tasmanian Disaster Resilience Strat-
egy (TDRS). Using these policies, this paper will explore if the normalisa-
tion of shared-responsibility, observed by its devolution from the
international through to local levels, reinforces McLennan and Handmer's
(2014) claim that it is only a partially articulated concept in the
Australian disaster policy landscape.
The paper is structured as follows. The ensuing section will unpack the
concepts of normalisation, biopolitics and shared-responsibility. The meth-
odology section will explain how the policies were analysed. The next sec-
tion will offer the findings framed on a taxonomy of obligations developed
by Lukasiewicz et al. (2017). The discussion section will then examine the
mismatch of expected disaster obligations and responsibilities existing be-
tween governments and citizens in Australia. Finally, the paperwill provide
the limitations of this research and conclude with avenues for future
research.
2. Literature review
Thefirst sectionwill depict the concepts of normalisation, biopower and
biopolitics as articulated by Foucault. The second section will describe the
literature on shared responsibility in the context of disaster risk reduction.
2.1. Normalisation
Normalisation can be viewed as a method which simultaneously ho-
mogenises and individualises subjects through ordering, observation, ex-
clusion, control, and intervention [7,8]. It is identified in many different
social practices including medical, disciplinary, and educative, among
others. The main aim of normalisation is to set a standard as to what deter-
mines normality, and conversely, what is then abnormal in society [12].
This is because the norm introduces, ‘a useful imperative and as a result
of measurement, all the shading of individual differences’ [13].
The goal of normalisation is to create subjects which are highly profi-
cient at undertaking a narrowly defined range of practices [14]. In disaster
management, normalisation is the homogenisation of the rules, standard
practices, and goals of disaster risk reduction that they can be broadly2
applied across society. Individuals and communities are then measured
by quantifying differences, those who do not conform are then used as a
level by which the normal, or conforming, are assessed. In shared-
responsibility discourses, it is the resilient versus the non-resilient, which
normalisation delineates.
To be effective, normalisation is legitimised through the use of experts.
These experts define not only the objects of their studies, but they also de-
termine the limits of them [15]. In the context of disaster management in
Australia, these experts are evidenced by consultation with the Common-
wealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation as well as heads of
state emergency services, universities, and other academic institutions. It
is through this legitimisation that normalisation becomes an apparatus
supporting a biopolitical regime. Therefore, once a norm has legitimised
rules, practices, guidelines, or expectations as set out by experts in any
given field, it can then target populations. As such, ‘the norm is something
that can be applied both to a body one wishes to discipline, and a popula-
tion one wishes to regularize’ [16].
The disciplining of a body before the regularisation of a population is
where normalisation and biopower converge. Normalisation, in effect,
acts like a parasite. It invests in both the successes of the sovereign
power, as well as that of the law, but without eliminating either [7]. Fou-
cault calls this act a systematic normalisation of the law. What it achieves,
is that judgements and measures about what is considered normal and ab-
normal, rather than absolute rights and wrongs, are given precedent in
any given population. Once this has occurred in a biopolitical regime, nei-
ther the sovereign nor the law, escapes the process of normalisation [7].2.2. Biopower and biopolitics
Likemany of Foucault's theories, biopower ismeant to be applied freely,
it is merely a tool to be utilised by an author [17]. Foucault also did not
maintain a rigorous separation between biopower and biopolitics and
used both terms interchangeably [18]. The literature on Foucault's theories
on biopower is vast, and a thorough examination of all facets of his works is
neither possible nor desirable in this paper. Consequently, this paper will
focus on how normalisation supports a biopolitical regime centred on the
control and regulation of populations, specifically in the context of
shared-responsibility in Australian disaster management discourses.
In the first volume of A History of Sexuality, Foucault highlights the im-
portance of normalisation as a technology of biopower. He posits that a
‘normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power
centred on life’ [19]. Mills (2013) highlights Foucault's assertion that in-
stead of norms being produced through prior acts, ‘the normal comes
first, and the norm is deduced from it’ [12]. Therefore, in biopolitics, it is
the norm that is deduced a posteriori, or only realised after the fact and
then applied to a population.
Once an interplay is established between different distributions of nor-
mality, the unfavourable, or abnormal, is brought into line with what is
considered favourable, or normal. This allows for the biopolitical control
of populations to follow. As Cavanagh (2018), extending on Goldman's
(2001) research [20] explains, biopolitics is ‘a means of shaping the values
and subjectivities of various human populations’ [21]. Consequently,
biopower signals a form of power that promotes the security and well-
being of individual and collective life [9]. In this case, community safety
is framed as a joint venture, a shared-responsibility. It produces knowledge
of the methods, ‘that sustain or inhibit various life processes’ [9]. In short,
the process of normalisation establishes rules, regulations, specifications,
goals, and processes, by which the control of a population or subject is
then possible. In disaster management this is achieved through the concept
of shared-responsibility being applied nation-wide. Consequently,
biopolitics can be seen as the application of a normalisation process on a
broad population. In order for it to be successfully applied, the normalisa-
tion process must be complete, otherwise a partial articulation occurs in
which norms, rules, roles, and responsibilities are still contested, or poorly
understood by those charged with its implementation.
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Shared-responsibility in Australia is traced back to works by McLennan
and Handmer (2014) and the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission,
developed in the post Black Saturday milieu. Marking the reorientation of
disaster management in Australia, the shared-responsibility paradigm ad-
vocated different responsibilities for different segments of the nation,
even if they were not equal responsibilities for all [22]. This reorientation
was solidified in Australia with the 2011 release of the National Strategy
for Disaster Resilience. This policy was considered the first step in a long
term reorganisation of disaster management in Australia and cemented
the concept of shared-responsibility as a vital element in creating disaster
resilient communities [2]. This change moved the focus away from the re-
sponse and recovery phases of the disastermanagement cycle to the preven-
tion/mitigation and preparation phases. This change built upon the earlier
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission conceptualisation of shared-
responsibility by exhorting communities, individuals, and households to
take a greater share of responsibility. This included the requirement to act
on information provided before, during, and after disasters, among other
responsibilities, as it was deemed that this could not be solely the domain
of agencies responsible for disaster management [2]. The normalisation
of a new paradigm in Australian disaster management begins with this re-
orientation. The policy window opened by the Black Saturday Bushfires
in Victoria facilitated a change in policy direction that required new
norms and rules, practices, and systems. If normalisation is the homogeni-
sation of practices, rules, and norms so that individuals a can undertake
simple, narrowly defined tasks, this change emphasised a new way in
which individuals are expected to plan for, and respond to, disasters.
Some of the vagueness surrounding shared-responsibility has been at-
tributed to differences in assigning and formalising responsibilities in
Australian legal and governance structures [23]. Blythe, McLennan and
Eburn (2015) identify that whilst the legal system in Australia is powerful
in holding parties responsible and enforcing sanctions and fines when
legal obligations are not met, governance systems ‘provide the structures
and processes through which parties attempt to influence, negotiate and
contest where responsibility lies, and ultimately make collective decisions
about how it is shared’ [10]. It is here that a normalisation process can be
seen. Normalisation acknowledges that debate and value trade-offs will
occur over how responsibility will be shared between governments and cit-
izens. This is an important step if new norms are to be legitimised and ac-
cepted by society.
Legitimacy is established by the size and scope by those responsible for
the creation of governance documents. This is evident in the collective in-
ternational contribution to the SFDRR that included the attendance of
6500 participants, 25 heads of state, 42 inter-governmental organisations,
236 non-government organisations, over 300 private sector representa-
tives, and 280 local governments [24].
Attendance and contributions are also well represented at the national
level in Australia with the NFDRR. However, the concepts of shared-
responsibility and resilience are defined in the SFDRR and then adopted
in the NFDRR and the TDRS without further elaboration. This highlights
the adoption of a partly articulated conception of shared-responsibility.
As such there are minimal inconsistencies as to how shared-responsibility
is ambiguously framed, as can be seen below,
“While States have the overall responsibility for reducing disaster risk, it
is a shared responsibility betweenGovernments and relevant stakeholders.”
[24]
“Disaster resilience and risk reduction is a shared responsibility, but
often not equally shared. While individuals and communities have their
roles to play, they do not control many of the levers needed to reduce
some disaster risks. Governments and industry in particular must take coor-
dinated action to reduce disaster risks within their control to limit adverse
impacts on communities.” [25]
Shared-responsibility is not mentioned by name in the TDRS, The strat-
egy notes that the TDRS aligns with the SFDRR and NFDRR which reflect
the common principles of “shared and defined responsibilities”. [26]3
Each document also quotes the same United Nations definition of
resilience:
“The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to re-
sist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a
timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and resto-
ration of its essential basic structures and functions.” [24]
Despite its elevation to prominence in Australian disaster manage-
ment discourses, shared-responsibility is minimally and vaguely repre-
sented in policies, signalling that Australian governments are content to
follow what it being articulated at an international level. Within the Oce-
ania region, the concept of shared-responsibility may be viewed as out-
dated concept as no reference to this term can be identified in the 2019
New Zealand National Disaster Resilience Strategy [27]. Similarly, in
Australian disaster polices such as the NFDRR and the TDRS, there is a
reluctance to use the term, and when it is, it is sparingly adopted and
left largely unexplained.
Claiming that shared-responsibility is a partially articulated social con-
tract due to an incomplete normalisation process supports a number of fur-
ther criticisms which have been levelled against resilience. Resilience has
been accused of facilitating a shift inwhich governments encumber individ-
uals and social institutions with responsibilities which are better addressed
at a governmental level [28]. Neoliberalism has also been linked with resil-
ience and disaster management insofar as that perturbations and disasters
legitimise the use of ‘state of emergencies’ where action and choice are
framed in the name of necessity and urgency [29]. In addition, as a narra-
tive, it lacks clarity [30] which can threaten the concepts contribution in ef-
forts to build resilience with no clear direction on how it is to be achieved
[31]. Furthermore, it may also be deemed not ‘fit-for-purpose’ in a world
which is increasingly characterised by complex socio-political-ecological is-
sues such as global warming and climate change [32,33]. A charge further
supported by claims that successful Disaster Risk Reduction is hampered by
a poor science-policy interface [34]. It also serves to compound achieving
priority one of the SFDRR insofar as fragmentation betweenwho is account-
able for distributing responsibility for risk management between govern-
ments and stakeholders within Disaster Risk Reduction and climate
change strategies [35]. Engagement with the private sector is also an area
where conflict over responsibility arises. Subsequently, the private sector
not only holds the potential to help or hinder future impacts from disasters,
but they are also required in achieving priority 4 of the SFDRR [36]. A con-
sequence of this ambiguity is that citizens become unclear as to who does
what and when [37], or as Eiser et al. (2012) identify, knowing the risk,
and knowing how to respond to the risk, are not necessarily the same
[38]. Nollkaemper (2018) identifies that the problem arising from
shared-responsibility is that it can be difficult not only for outsiders, but
also for insiders to understand whom responsibility can be ascribed to,
should something go wrong. The more diffused the group, the more diffi-
cult it becomes as responsibility is scattered among different groups, indi-
vidual responsibility becomes more diminished in turn [39]. As shared-
responsibility is identified as a necessary element in engendering resilience
in Australia, it adds to recent criticisms levelled at both resilience and sus-
tainability in that it has become, or is becoming, an ‘empty signifier’ [40]
insofar as the term could mean everything to everyone. Consequently,
this contributes further towards confusion regarding the streamlining of
rules, regulations, aspirations, and processes.
A reason for these criticisms is that shared-responsibility as a concept is
being applied biopoliticaly in disastermanagement systems in Australia. Si-
multaneously, the normalisation (or homogenisation) of the rules, norms,
and goals which underpin it, are only partially completed. The result is a
partially articulated social contract and disempowered communities.3. Methods
The methodology adopted in this article involves word frequency anal-
ysis based around the concept of shared-responsibility thatwas identified in
one international and two Australian disaster management policies.
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The disaster focussed policies selected for this study are the SFDRR, the
NFDRR, and the TDRS. These three documents were chosen to illustrate the
normalisation of shared-responsibility and the terms, concepts, rules, and
goals, which permeates from the international level, through the national
level in Australia, before finally being adopted by the state level in Tasma-
nia. The Australian National Strategy for Disaster Resilience is excluded be-
cause it predates the release of the SFDRR and is well represented in both
the NFDRR and TDRS.
3.1.1. SFDRR
The SFDRR is the successor framework for the 2005 Hyogo Framework
for Action. The SFDRR is intended to apply to small and large scale, fre-
quent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters. It aims to ‘guide
the multi-hazard management of disaster risk in development at all levels
as well as within and across all sectors’ [1]. The SFDRR illustrates that the
normative process began at the international level and has diffused down-
wards to the national and state level. It reflects a global consensus on not
only reducing the risks posed by disasters, but also the manner in how
they are to be addressed.
3.1.2. NFDRR
TheNFDRR translates the first three SFDRR priorities into action for the
Australian context. It is intended to guide national, whole-of-society efforts
to reduce disaster risk with the aim of minimizing loss and suffering caused
by disasters. As such, shared-responsibility is a key guiding principle in the
NFDRR.
3.1.3. TDRS
The TDRS aligns with the SFDRR and related national frameworks such
as the Australian National Strategy for Disaster Resilience and the NFDRR.
As such, the document follows common disaster resilience strategies and
uses terminology such as shared and defined responsibilities.
3.2. Taxonomy of shared responsibility
Lukasiewicz et al. (2017) provide a comprehensive taxonomy of what
constitutes shared-responsibility, as well as the obligations for govern-
ments, individuals, and the collective action required to attain these goals
in an Australian setting. This taxonomy, when coupled with their list of ob-
ligations, illustrates how shared-responsibility can support a biopolitical re-
gime used to control and steer a population. The specific responsibilities of
Australian government and individuals used in this paper were identified
from this taxonomy. The responsibilities of government pertain to ‘distrib-
uting obligations’ and the responsibilities of individuals relate to ‘accepting
obligations’. Table 1 provides some examples of the responsibilities of gov-
ernment and individuals as articulated by Lukasiewicz et al. (2017) and the
key words used for the data analysis in this paper. Table 2 provides the
word frequency of government and individual responsibilities.Table 1
Responsibilities of government and individuals.
Entity Obligation Example of a possible responsibilities pr
Government Distribution Pragmatically helping communities to reco
Strategic planning to minimise disaster risk
Supporting individuals & communities to p
Clarification of responsibilities to enable a
Coordination of human & physical resource
Pragmatically helping communities to reco
Individual Acceptance Understanding risks and adequately prepar
Preparing a personal disaster (fire/flood) p
Assuming responsibility for vulnerable hou
Acting on advice received from governmen
Complying with specific legal obligations o
Implementing own fire/flood plan
Following emergency services' directions du
4
3.3. Analysis
To aide in the analysis of the policies we used the computer-assisted
qualitative data analysis software, NVivo. The first step was to calculate
the frequency of occurrences across the assigned categories of responsibili-
ties. Word frequency is advantageous as it identifies patterns more easily,
can verify a hypothesis, maintains analytic integrity and rigour, and de-
creases researcher bias regarding overweighting [41]. Importantly, NVivo
allowed us to use the word frequency option using words with stemmed
variants (e.g. coordinate, coordinated, coordinating, coordination). A
word frequency was performed for each of the key words identified from
Lukasiewicz et al.'s (2017) taxonomy (Table 1) for each individual policy
and then collectively across all three policies. To provide additional context
to the word frequency, NVivo was used to create ‘words trees’. Word trees
allowed the visual display of the frequently appearing words in the context
of how they were referenced in the policies. This confirmed applicability of
the key words used in the analysis (Figs. 1 and 2).
4. Findings
In Australia, the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) can be
seen as a part of the early development in the reorganisation regarding how
disasters are addressed. The SFDRR advanced disaster risk reduction and
also the shared-responsibility discourse to the international agenda in
howdisasters aremanaged. However, this did not translate into a deeper ar-
ticulation of what shared-responsibility contained. The SFDRR highlighted
shared-responsibility as its second guiding principle in disaster risk reduc-
tion. Nevertheless, aside from noting that there are ‘roles and responsibili-
ties for national governments and relevant stakeholders’ [1], there is no
further elaboration as to what this entails. The NFDRR, which represents
Australia's implementation of the SFDRR, contains the same articulation
of shared-responsibility, highlighting again that it is unequally shared in di-
saster management [42]. Shared-responsibility is touted as a guiding prin-
ciple in the document but further elaboration as to what this involves is
not included. The TDRS aligns with both the SFDRR and the NFDRR. The
strategy aligns with national and international standards and practices
within contemporary Tasmanian disaster management structures. Shared-
responsibility is alluded to briefly insofar as that the SFDRR and NFDRR re-
flect common principles of disaster resilience; including shared roles and
responsibilities. Simply put, permeating from the international level down
is a clear-cut observation that shared-responsibility is important in disaster
resilience and risk reduction measures. However, how it is to be achieved,
what it involves, the rules, standards, norms, and systems which support it
are left absent in these documents.
The findings identified that distributing obligations entail the responsi-
bilities of government to educate, plan, support, clarify, coordinate, and
help citizens. In some cases there is a linear lowering of emphasis as the ed-
ucation of citizens is exhorted at an international level, weighted at 0.29%
before dropping to 0.19% in the NFDRR, and then to 0.09% in the TDRS.
Other government obligations rise and fall depending on the document.ovided by Lukasiewicz et al (2017) Key words used in analysis
ver & adapt to next disaster (Public) Educating
(Strategic) Planning
repare for disasters Support
whole-of- government approach to disasters Clarifying
s Coordination
ver & adapt to next disaster Helping
ing for them Understanding (risk)
lan within the household Preparation
sehold members Responsibility
t and other community sources Acting (on advice)
f homeowners & renters to maintain a property Compliance
Implementation
ring a disaster Following (direction)
Table 2
Word frequency of government and individual responsibilities.
Obligation Responsibilities Individual policies
Collectively
SFDRR NFDRR TDRS
Stemmed words Count Weighted
%
Stemmed words Count Weighted
%
Stemmed words Count Weighted
%




Educating education, educational 36 0.29 education 9 0.19 educational 2 0.09 education, educational 47 0.24
Planning plan, planning, plans 55 0.45 plan, planned, planning 20 0.43 plan, planning, plans 30 1.34 plan, planned, planning, plans 105 0.55
Support support, supported,
supporting, supportive
75 0.61 support, supported,
supporting, supports
19 0.41 support, supported,
supporting,








38 0.31 coordinated, coordination 5 0.11 coordination 2 0.09 coordinate, coordinated,
coordinating, coordination
45 0.23





17 0.14 understand, understanding 22 0.47 understand, understanding,
understands





35 0.29 prepare, preparedness 6 0.13 preparation, prepare,
prepared, preparing,
preparedness









73 0.59 response, responsibilities,
responsibility, responsible
23 0.49 response, responses,
responsibilities,






n/a 0 0.00 act, acted, acting 5 0.11 act, acting 6 0.27 act, acted, acting 11 0.06








14 0.30 n/a 0 0.00 implement, implementation,
implemented, implementing
100 0.52











Fig. 1. Example of a word tree for the term ‘education’.
Fig. 2. Example of a word tree for the term “prepare’.
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fore more than tripling to 1.34% in the TDRS. The same can be observed
in the occurrence of the term support that is 0.61% in the SFDRR, 0.41%
in NFDRR, and then tripling to 1.20% in the TDRS. The only example of
conformity across all documents examined was that of the term clarifica-
tion. This word was not mentioned in the SFDRR and mentioned only
twice in the NFDRR and TDRS respectively. The occurrence of the obliga-
tion to coordinate (and its associated word stems) is reflected at 0.31% in
the SFDRR, dropping to 0.11% in the NFDRR and then to 0.09% in the
TDRS. The term help is barely mentioned in both the SFDRR and NFDRR
(0.02% and 0.09%) before jumping to 0.45% in the TDRS.
The question at this juncture is what does this mean? For government
obligations, what the findings illustrate is that new norms and rules in
how governments perceive their obligations are weighted differently de-
pending on what level and document they appear in. Governments seem
to be willing to educate, plan, and support in varying levels, however,
when it comes to clarifying, coordinating, and helping their citizens, they
seem less inclined to assume the responsibility.
On accepting (individual) obligations, the same inconsistency and con-
fusion can be seen across the Australian policies examined in this paper. In-
dividual obligations, and their word stems: of understanding; preparation;
(accept) responsibility; acting (on advice); implementation; and following;
were employed to highlight individual obligations within disaster manage-
ment. Much like the government obligations, there are inconsistencies and
confusion surrounding what individuals are expected to know and do. De-
pending on the document, individuals can be expected to prepare, that is
reflected by 0.29% in the SFDRR, 0.13% in the NFDRR, and then 1.25%
in the TDRS. Individuals are consistently asked to accept their responsibil-
ities as identified by 0.59% in the SFDRR, and 0.40% in both the NFDRR
and TDRS. However, acting on advice provided is negligent in the SFDRR
andmentioned only five and six times in the SFDRR and TDRS. Compliance
and its associated stem words are mentioned twice in both the SFDRR and
the NFDRR, and not at all in the TDRS. Implementation is mentioned
heavily in the SFDRR (0.70%), moderately in the NFDRR (0.30%) and
not at all in the TDRS, correspondingly, the term following is mentioned
at 0.18% in the SFDRR, before being mentioned twice in the NFDRR and
once in the TDRS. Based on these findings it could be gleaned that an indi-
vidual is expected to accept that they have responsibilities and prepare, but
they are under no obligation to act on advice, nor comply, nor follow what
is exhorted. Individuals are also, to varying degrees, obligated to implement
their plans, or in the case of Tasmania, not at obligated at all.
5. Discussion
The findings from this paper articulate the mismatch of expected disas-
ter obligations and responsibilities that currently exist between govern-
ments and citizens in Australia. As observed by McLennan and Handmer
(2014), shared-responsibility represents a partially articulated social con-
tract between governments and their citizens. The taxonomy of obligations
developed from Lukasiewicz et al. (2017) combined with Foucauldian the-
ory illustrates that this is in part because of an incomplete normalisation
process followed by the use of shared-responsibility as part of a biopolitical
regime. Since the concept of shared-responsibility and resilience theory are
no longer in their infancy, both concepts have been a part of Australian di-
saster management discourses for more than a decade [43], this represents
a failure of governments to properly prepare citizens for their expected
duties in the preparation for, response to, and recovery from, disasters.
Combining the taxonomy of obligations with targeted word searches in
three significant disaster policies, highlights how considerable the incom-
plete process of normalisation is, and the confusion which emerges from
its biopolitical application in contemporary Australia.
When table two is viewed in its entirety an alarming pattern is evident.
Governments in Australia expect individuals to accept that they have re-
sponsibilities and to act accordingly. However, when it comes to helping,
clarifying, or coordinating them, governments have indicated that they7
are prepared to educate, or provide the means and support for individuals
to do so themselves. Individuals then, are to prepare and implement accord-
ing to government exhortations, but are under no obligation to comply
with, act on or follow advice. This is an observation consistent with resil-
ience being used as a means to responsibilise individuals [44], as well as
the difficulties in assigning and formalising responsibilities in Australian
legal and governance structures [23]. Furthermore, shared-responsibility
could no longer be ‘fit-for-purpose’ in a world which is increasingly
characterised by complex socio-political-ecological issues such as global
warming and climate change. As identified earlier, an example of how
shared-responsibility may be viewed as an already out-dated concept can
be found in the 2019 New Zealand National Disaster Resilience Strategy
where there is nomention of shared-responsibility [27]. This is exemplified
by the reluctance to use the term in both the NFDRR and TDRS, andwhen it
is, it is sparingly done and left largely unexplained.
An explanation for this is that shared-responsibility as a concept is being
employed in a disaster management biopolitical regime in Australia, while
the normalisation (or homogenisation) or rules, norms, and goals which un-
derpin it is only partially completed itself. This results in a partially articu-
lated social contract which enhances the disempowerment of Australian
communities.
6. Limitations
The main limitation with this paper is that it is Australian-centric and
only explores the disaster policy of one Australian state. However, the au-
thors never set out on a journey to generalize the findings. The aim of the
article was to highlight that an incomplete process of normalisation is re-
sponsible for claims that shared-responsibility is not only a partially articu-
lated social contract, but that this incomplete process also explains how
communities are further disempowered.
7. Conclusions
Preparing for and responding to disasters is a complex task and devolv-
ing policy can be an attractive option. Shared-responsibility has become a
ubiquitous within disaster management discourses. Lukasiewicz et al.
(2017) have highlighted the obligations for both Australian citizens and
governments in shared-responsibility. By viewing this term as partially ar-
ticulated and the result of an incomplete normalisation process, once
their obligations are applied to central policy framework documents it
can be seen that this results in a biopolitical regime marred by vagueness
and ambiguity. Using central policy documents such as the SFDRR, the
NFDRR, and the recently released TDRS to illustrate how normalisation is
devolved from the international level down, highlights this problem
further.
This article sought to uncover government and individual responsibili-
ties in Australian disaster management policies. In analysing the SFDRR,
the NFDRR, and the TDRS, what can be seen is that governments in
Australia expect individuals to accept that they have responsibilities and
to act accordingly. However, when it comes to helping, clarifying, or coor-
dinating them, governments have indicated that they are prepared to edu-
cate, or provide the means and support for individuals to do so
themselves. Individuals then, are to prepare and implement according to
government exhortations, but are under no obligation to comply with, act
on or follow advice. This offers an explanation as to why shared-
responsibility has been characterised as not only a partially articulated so-
cial contract but can also serve to disempower communities.
An avenue for future research would be to investigate whether this oc-
curs in other Australian states and what policy challenges occur inter-
jurisdictionally. This aligns to the question of whether resilience and
shared-responsibility are being used as scapegoats to encumber individuals
and communities with responsibility within disaster management. Given
the complex nature of disaster risk reduction policy, the implications of cli-
matic instability wrought from a warming climate, and the continuing
C. Atkinson, S. Curnin Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100122evolution of disaster management as a field, closer scrutiny on macro and
meso level policy is required. It is only by analysing documents such as
those analysed in this paper that the process of normalisation can be viewed
in separate jurisdictions. Doing so will allow for inconsistencies to be iden-
tified and for a more streamlined understanding of roles and responsibili-
ties for all involved.
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